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Abstract
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liberalization, in an environment where firms can lobby the government for or against
a proposed agreement. Lobbying is modelled as an all-pay auction, incorporating the
feature that binding contracts over contributions for policies cannot be written. This
approach gives rise to the possibility that a trade agreement may not go ahead even if
it would increase efficiency. In this set-up, if a proposed agreement is over non-tariff
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1 Introduction
It is generally understood that the outcome of a trade agreement is determined by a tension
between competing interests. In real-world commentaries of trade agreements, this tension
is usually identified between export sectors on the one hand who favor greater openness and
import-competing sectors on the other who favor greater protection. For example, the UK
government’s Department for Trade and Industry report to Parliament on the outcome of
the Uruguay Round focused first and foremost on the benefits to UK export sectors (DTI
1994, 10). (The Uruguay Round was the last successfully completed round of trade talks
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT). The phasing out of the
Multi-Fibre Agreement also received attention because this lowered tariffs in industrialized
countries on textiles and clothing, which the UK imports largely from developing countries
but where it still maintains some competing interests. This basic approach of considering
‘export sectors versus import competing sectors’ is mirrored in literature on the economics of
trade agreements as well (Grossman and Helpman 1995, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998,
Bagwell and Staiger 1999).
At the same time there appears to be an awareness that, even within a sector, firms’
interests over a trade agreement may conflict. Perhaps surprisingly, given the present focus
on the behavior of firms in economics, it has been political scientists rather than economists
who have emphasized this dimension of conflicting interests between firms. This division is
expressed most clearly by Thacker (1998, 2000) in his study of Mexican business interests and
their relationship with government and trade liberalization: “Where oligopolistic markets
exist and economies of scale give competitive advantages to large firms, size will also affect a
firm’s trade policy preferences. Under these conditions, larger firms will be more competitive
internationally and therefore more likely to favor free trade. Smaller firms will be more
protectionist” (Thacker 1998, 3). This view is also at the heart of work on the GATT and
World Trade Organization (WTO) by Cowles (1998) and Aaronson (2001) for example. And
this view is represented albeit more subtlely in real-world accounts of trade agreements as
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well. For example, DTI (1994, 10, para. 5.13) in the assessment of the Uruguay round
discussed above, also draws attention to the fact that UK firms both export industrial
electronics and compete with foreign imports in the same sector. The present paper develops
a model of a trade agreement that puts at centre stage the competing interests not of sectors
but of firms. It determines the set of circumstances under which a trade agreement will be
reached and the extent of trade liberalization in an environment where firms can lobby the
government for the policy that they would prefer.
The economic model is essentially that of Melitz (2003): in each of two countries, a con-
tinuum of monopolistically competitive firms produces a horizontally differentiated product
at varying degrees of productivity. One of the main predictions of Melitz (2003) is that larger
firms tend to export while smaller firms tend only to serve the domestic market. Through-
out our analysis, we make the standard assumption that the variation in productivity across
firms is approximated by the Pareto distribution. Trade restrictions are captured by one of
two possible instruments: iceberg transport costs or ad valorem tariffs.
Starting from autarky, a trade agreement is reached according to the following procedure.
The two governments announce a proposed agreement to lower trade restrictions, to the same
level, across the two countries. The proposed level can lie anywhere below autarky and is
bounded from below at free trade. Each firm then has one of two options with regard to
lobbying. It can contribute to a lobby group that will lobby the government in support of the
proposed trade agreement. Or it can contribute an amount to a lobby group that will lobby
the government in support of the status quo at autarky. This captures the well known feature
of real-world trade policy-making that firms form lobby groups to lobby for and against trade
agreements. For example, the ‘Alliance for GATT Now’ group was formed to support the
Uruguay Round vote whereas the ‘Labor/Industry Coalition for International Trade’ was
(someone incongruously) formed to lobby against it (Dam 2001, 14). It is through this set of
policy interactions that the equilibrium trade agreement configuration will be determined.
Our framework abstracts entirely from the role of consumers in order to focus on interactions
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between firms and their national government in lobbying over trade policy. This approach
is tractable and approximates a more general framework that incorporates consumers but
where there is a relatively large weight in the government’s payoff function on contributions
made by firms.
We will make the assumption that once contributions have been made they cannot be
retrieved regardless of the outcome. This assumption is reasonable given that in many
national legislatures including the US Congress it is illegal for lobby groups to ‘pay by
results’. Based on the assumption that contributions are irretrievable, we model the lobbying
process as an all-pay auction (with common knowledge). An all-pay auction is like a regular
first-price auction except that everyone must pay their bids. Use of an all-pay auction to
model lobbying over trade policy was first proposed by Hillman (1988) and has been used
to model a wide variety of political contests where contributions are sunk.
We begin our analysis of trade agreement outcomes by focusing on the case where trade
restrictions are approximated by iceberg transport costs. This reflects the standard approach
in the literature on heterogenous firms, and is the most tractable approach to the modeling
of trade restrictions in this setting. We will refer to iceberg transport costs as ‘non-tariff
barriers’ (NTBs) to clarify that they are determined by the government (as opposed to being
determined by geography) but raise no revenue. A surprising feature of this set-up is that the
contributions made by firms who favor autarky is identical to that for the trade agreement.
This result depends on the assumption that firm productivity is distributed Pareto and
holds regardless of the extent of trade liberalization under the agreement. In equilibrium,
the proposed trade agreement entails free trade because this extracts the largest average
contributions from firms.
A novel feature of the equilibrium is that the trade agreement does not go ahead with
certainty. This outcome rests on the underlying all-pay auction structure to the process
of lobbying. An environment where everyone forfeits their contribution regardless of the
outcome creates an incentive to increase contributions more aggressively. But once one
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lobby group contributes its full valuation for the outcome then the other lobby group has
an incentive to contribute nothing. The first lobby group, knowing this, now only wants to
contribute a small amount, but then the incentive to raise contributions aggressively arises
once again. So there can be no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Consequently, lobbies
randomize their contributions and this in turn introduces a degree of uncertainty into the
outcome. This uncertainty is appealing in that it stems from the ‘real world’ feature that it
is not possible for a lobby group to write a contract with the government that is enforceable
in a court of law.
We then redo the analysis of the trade agreement formation but instead of NTBs we
assume that trade restrictions are modelled as (ad valorem) tariffs. Tariffs alter the anal-
ysis from NTBs in two ways. Tariffs generate revenue for the government and, as Besedesˇ
and Cole (2013), Cole (2011), Schro¨der and Sørensen (2011), and others have shown, ad
valorem tariffs affect the extensive margin differently than iceberg transport costs in models
of monopolistic competition. With this set-up, starting from autarky, unlike for NTBs a
move toward (but not including) free trade would yield lower aggregate profits because a
proportion of exporters’ profits are shifted abroad by foreign tariffs. However, with tariffs,
the variation in the level of openness across possible agreements also implies variation in the
level of tariff revenue. Hence, when combined with lobbying revenues, one possible agreement
may be more attractive to the government than others. In this setting, we are able to show
that the government will choose between two possible outcomes (depending on parameter
values). One is free trade while the other is the tariff that maximizes tariff revenue. If free
trade is chosen it is because the forces to liberalize illustrated by the NTB case dominate,
whereby maximizing lobby revenues push the government towards free trade. If an agree-
ment arises where tariff revenue is maximized then, interestingly, the lobbies choose not to
contribute but the agreement goes ahead with certainty.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the use of a menu auction to model the process
of lobbying over trade policy has become standard in the literature on the political economy
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of tariff setting. Therefore, it is important to explain how the outcome of a trade agreement
where lobbying by heterogeneous firms takes place according to a menu auction, the approach
adopted by Chang and Willman (2014), would differ and why use of an all-pay auction
approach is preferable in our context. The first difference to note is that the standard
(conceptual) starting point for a menu auction to determine trade policy is free trade. In
our setting, adopting free trade as a starting point would omit the the influence of firms that
would prefer autarky once it had been adopted but who are unprofitable at free trade and so
do not produce, let alone engage in the lobbying process. Using our analysis of NTBs as a
reference point, under free trade whereby a number of firms that would lobby for autarky do
not produce, firms that prefer trade would always have sufficient resources to ensure through
lobbying that the equilibrium remained at free trade. For this reason, it makes more sense
to follow Melitz (2003) and assume that the starting point is autarky and not free trade.
There remains the question of whether we could start the lobbying process at autarky but
still use a menu auction to replace the all-pay auction process that we have adopted. This
would be straight forward, but yield significantly less interesting results than when lobbying
is modelled as an all-pay auction. For the agreement over NTBs, the outcome under a menu
auction is that the total contribution level by the firms that favor free trade is the same as by
those that favor autarky, with the outcome being determined by a tie-breaking rule. For the
agreement over tariffs, the outcome always goes in the direction of the firms that prefer free
trade because, with the help of tariff revenue, they are always able to dominate the lobbying
process and swing the outcome in their favor. So we lose the interesting feature that arises
under the all-pay auction approach whereby an agreement that would raise efficiency may
fail to go ahead.
There are currently two main strands to the literature on trade agreements. The first
strand, associated with Bagwell and Staiger (1999), focuses on trade agreements under the
institutional arrangements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World
Trade Organization (WTO). Under this approach, interest groups may lobby governments
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who may also be subject to distributional concerns. Bagwell and Staiger show that a trade
agreement is motivated by the terms-of-trade externality that arises when countries have
power on world markets. When setting tariffs, each country fails to internalize the negative
terms-of-trade externality that its tariff imposes. The two GATT/WTO pillars of reciprocity
and nondiscrimination allow countries to escape the terms-of-trade externality and reach an
efficient agreement. In Bagwell and Staiger’s framework, if the import-competing interests in
each country are equally opposed, and if each government does not have any distributional
concerns of its own, then the equilibrium outcome of a trade agreement would be free trade.
In our framework, countries are large in our framework and can improve their terms of trade
through tariff setting. And interest groups can lobby the government to try to sway the
outcome of an agreement in the direction that they would like to see it go. But, in contrast
to previous contributions to this strand of the literature, trade agreements in our paper are
not driven by changes in the terms of trade so much as by gains that arise from variation in
firm productivity.
Under the second branch, that highlights a commitment problem faced by governments
wishing to liberalize, terms of trade losses through trade liberalization are small relative to
efficiency gains, and the case for trade liberalization is essentially a unilateral one (Staiger
and Tabellini 1987, Staiger 1995, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998). The argument is that
trade agreements can serve as a means through which a government can commit to trade
liberalization in the face of opposition from protectionist forces, say industrial interest groups,
within its own nation. There is a sense in which this motivation for a trade agreement
exists within our framework as well. In our model no firm would agree to unilateral trade
liberalization as they would lose domestic market share without gaining a greater share of
export markets. Hence trade liberalization must be reciprocated in order for it to take place
at all. However, reciprocal trade liberalization is an assumption in our framework and we
do not explore the role of trade agreement as commitment device in this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. It begins with a brief
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recapitulation of the Melitz model and then goes on to explain how lobbying works and how
the trade agreement is determined. Section 3 then examines the scope for reaching a trade
agreement, first for NTBs and then for tariffs. It is here that we characterize the trade
agreements that may arise under each of the two trade policy instruments. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 4.
2 The Model
There are two countries in the model, Home and Foreign. Variables pertaining to Foreign
are denoted with a superscript ∗. There are two goods. Good X comprises a continuum
of differentiated varieties, each of which is indexed by i. As is standard in the Melitz
model, these varieties are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms,
correspondingly indexed by i, each using an increasing returns to scale technology. There is
free entry in sector X but entry into the sector is costly, so profits are zero in expectation
but positive ex post. Each variety of good X may face a trade barrier as it crosses the
border between the countries. Good Y is a homogeneous good that is produced under
constant returns to scale, perfect competition and free trade. We will choose good Y as the
numeriare and, since it is freely traded, world prices and domestic prices of this good can be
normalized to 1. Each unit of good Y is produced from just one unit of labor, and so the
wage is normalized to 1 as well. The role of good Y in the model is to capture the general
equilibrium effects of trade agreement formation. For this purpose, we will assume that each
country is endowed with a sufficient quantity of labor that enough of good Y is produced
to clear the trade account in equilibrium. In terms of economic structure, the two countries
are identical to one another but will produce different varieties in a trading equilibrium.
There are two time periods. In period 1 there is autarky, with trade restrictions set at
prohibitive levels. Producers of good X undertake entry decisions and production. Then
markets clear for period 1 and consumption takes place. In period 2, the governments
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may announce a proposed trade agreement, which entails a symmetrical reduction in trade
restrictions to a level that would allow at least some trade, possibly free trade, between
the countries. Governments are able to communicate with each other over the proposed
trade agreement before announcing it, and each has veto power over the agreement prior to
announcement (but not afterwards). Once the proposed trade agreement is announced, each
firm predicts (perfectly) the amount of profit it would earn under the alternatives of autarky
and the trade agreement and hence which policy it would prefer. There are two lobbyists,
one named LA that supports the status quo of autarky in sector X and one named LT that
supports the trade agreement. Each firm makes a contribution to one of the lobby groups,
depending on the regime under which its profits would be maximized. We will assume that
within the group of firms making contributions to a particular lobbyist the collective action
problem is resolved. Aggregate contributions made by all firms in support of autarky to LA
total lA and aggregate contributions in support of the trade agreement to LT total lT . Once
collected, these contributions are passed by the lobby groups to the government and cannot
be retrieved thereafter. The policy that receives the greatest financial support, autarky or
the trade agreement, is then enacted. If the trade agreement goes ahead, the government
resets tariffs in accordance with the agreement. Finally, conditional on tariffs, consumption
takes place and markets clear.
Although we will undertake separate treatments of trade agreements over NTBs and
tariffs, our development of the model will incorporate both instruments simultaneously. This
will provide a parsimonious representation of the model and makes it possible to compare
the effects of the two restrictions. The remainder of this section specifies the specific details
of the model.
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2.1 Consumers
Let the utility function for the representative agent in Home take the following form:
U = µ ln (X) + Y (1)
where
X =
(∫
i∈Ω
x(i)αdi
) 1
α
,
where 0 < α < 1, and ε = 1/(1− α) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of X ,
and Ω is the set of varieties available to the consumer. Demand for each good by a consumer
in Home is
x(i) =
p(i)−εµ
P1−ε
where p(i) is the price of variety i sold in home, and
P1−ε =
∫
i∈Ω
p(i)1−εdi
is the aggregate price index in Home. An analogous set of equations holds for the foreign
country where, by assumption, µ∗ = µ.
2.2 Heterogeneous Firms
Firms considering entry to sector X face a one time sunk market entry cost fE (measured in
units of labor). If this cost is paid, the firm then draws a constant marginal cost coefficient
a from the Pareto distribution
G(a) =
(
a
aU
)k
, 0 < a < aU
where the shape parameter k > (ε − 1).We will denote by ai the marginal cost drawn by
firm i. Once this is observed, a firm decides whether or not to undertake production. If
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it chooses to produce, it must incur an additional fixed cost fD paid each period. If trade
restrictions are at a level that allows for trade, a firm must pay an additional fixed cost
fX = γfD > fD in order to serve the foreign market. Production exhibits constant returns
to scale with labor as the only factor of production.
The decision of whether or not to undertake production and whether to export depends
on the associated profits. Fixing the wage equal to 1, the per-period operating profit of firm
i facing marginal cost ai and selling only domestically is
πD(i) = [p(i)− ai]QD(i)− fD
=
[
[p(i)− ai]µ
P1−ε
]
p(i)−ε − fD.
A firm selling domestically will charge a price equal to a constant markup over marginal
cost, p(i) = ai
α
. Therefore, the operating profit function for a purely domestic firm is
πD(i) = a
1−ε
i B − fD (2)
where
B =
1
εα1−ε
( µ
P1−ε
)
.
In order to reach the foreign market, in addition to the fixed cost γfD, firm i incurs a
per-unit cost arising from either an NTB or a tariff: modelled as an iceberg transport cost,
τ > 1, and an ad valorem tariff, t > 1, respectively. For tractability we assume that any tariff
revenue is used by the government to consume only the numeriare.1 Thus the additional
1Tariff revenue can only affect demand for good X if: (1) The government’s preferences are not, in fact,
encompassed by the representative consumer and the government demands some of good X ; (2) Tariffs are
not symmetric across countries and thus income is being shifted from one country to the other (however this
is not an issue with quasi-linear utility) or; (3) The government simply throws the revenue away (this is not
an issue with quasi-linear utility as long as a positive amount of the numeriare is produced and consumed).
We do not allow for these three possibilities in our model.
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operating profit from exporting for a firm that exports is
πX =
(tτai)
1−εB∗
t
− γfD, (3)
where
B∗ =
1
εα1−ε
( µ
P∗1−ε
)
.
The set-up is standard in the literature on heterogenous firms.
2.3 Government
The government’s objective is to maximize income, which is derived entirely from tariff
revenue and contributions by lobbyists. The government consumes only the numeriare good.
Therefore, the only effect of government policy on sector X comes through the distortions
created by t and τ . In period 2 when governments may propose a trade agreement the Home
government’s problem is formalized as follows:
max
t,τ
{lA(t, τ), lT (t, τ) + TR(t, τ)}, (4)
where TR(t, τ) represents tariff revenue for given t and τ . (Recall that in period 1 when
there is autarky the government earns no income). The Foreign government’s problem is
analogous. The government chooses whichever policy receives the greatest financial support,
autarky or the trade agreement. If lA(t, τ ) = lT (t, τ ) + TR(t, τ) then we will assume that a
coin toss determines whether or not the trade agreement goes ahead.
Although the problem here is defined over NTBs and tariffs, τ and t, by assumption
governments will make an agreement over only one instrument. That is, in the next section
tariffs will be set to zero (t = 1) while we first consider an agreement over NTBs, and after
that NTBs will be set to zero (τ = 1) while we consider an agreement over tariffs. Until we
consider each type of agreement in turn, we will continue to develop the model in terms of
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both t and τ together.
2.4 Lobby Groups
Based on the assumption that contributions to the government cannot be retrieved once they
have been made, we can model the lobbying process as a first price all-pay auction (with
complete information). Lobbies contest the government’s decision over whether or not to
adopt a trade agreement. The contribution that each lobby group makes to the government
may be regarded as a (non-negative) sealed bid. The ‘value’ to LA of maintaining autarky,
denoted vA, is given by
vA = NE
∫ aA
ϕ
(πA (a)− πT (a)) dG (a) , (5)
where NE is the number (mass) of entrepreneurs taking a draw from the productivity dis-
tribution, ϕ is the firm that is just indifferent between autarky and the trade agreement, aA
is the least efficient firm in autarky, and πA(a) and πT (a) are the respective profit levels of
firm a ∈ [ϕ, aA] under autarky and the trade agreement.2 Similarly, the ‘value’ to LT of the
trade agreement being adopted is
vT = NE
∫ ϕ
0
(πT (a)− πA (a)) dG (a) . (6)
On this basis, the value of each lobby group to swaying the government’s decision in its
favor depends on the underlying profits made under the respective policies of autarky and
the trade agreement. The payoff to lobby LA is given by
uA (t, τ ) =


−lA(t, τ)
vA
2
− lA(t, τ )
vA − lA(t, τ )
if
lA(t, τ) < lT (t, τ ) + TR(t, τ)
lA(t, τ) = lT (t, τ ) + TR(t, τ)
lA(t, τ) > lT (t, τ ) + TR(t, τ)
(A)
(B)
(C)
. (7)
2These terms will be defined explicitly when we characterize the equilibrium.
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The payoff function for LT is analogous. This specification of the payoff function makes clear
that each lobby group contributes regardless of the outcome.
3 Trade Agreements with Heterogenous Firms
Now we calculate whether or not the governments of Home and Foreign would reach an
agreement to move away from autarky and, if so, whether or not it would be characterized by
free trade. We begin by setting out the framework for analyzing the outcome of the lobbying
process with an examination of autarky equilibrium and then proceed to characterize a trade
agreement.
3.1 Autarky
Use subscript-A to denote autarky. There exists a cutoff marginal cost aA which represents
the productivity of the firm that is indifferent, under autarky, between supplying the domestic
market and exiting. Using equation (2), this is characterized by:
fD =
µ
ε
(
aA
αPA
)1−ε
. (8)
There is free entry, so that an entrepreneur will pay to take a draw from the productivity
distribution as long as the present value of average profits π¯ is positive. We assume that
firms fully discount profits in period 2, and so take into account only the expected profit in
the current period when making their entry decision.3 The free entry condition is
V (aA)BA −G(aA)fD = fE (9)
where
V (z) =
∫ z
0
a1−εdG(a) =
k
k − ε+ 1
(
z
aU
)k
z1−ε.
3This assumption does not affect the qualitative results, but affects the level of firms taking a draw, NE .
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Conditions (8) and (9) close the model and pin down aA and the number (mass) of en-
trepreneurs taking a draw from the productivity distribution, NE .
We restrict entry to period 1 only, and our only equilibrium conditions are the non-
negative profit conditions. This set of assumptions would only be restrictive if more en-
trepreneurs wanted to take a productivity draw under the trade agreement than under au-
tarky. In that case we would need to account for these new entrants and how they might
lobby.4 Our approach of fixing the mass of entrants is not unlike others in the literature
such as Do and Levchenko (2009), Eaton and Kortum (2005), Chaney (2008), and Arkolakis
(2008). Since we have assumed firm productivity is distributed Pareto, we can find closed
form solutions for these two variables:
aA =
[
ψfE
fD
] 1
k
aU ,
NE =
αµ
kfE
,
where
ψ ≡ [k − (ε− 1)]
(ε− 1) > 0.
Note that all parameters are identical across countries, so it follows that aA = a
∗
A. Further-
more, in order to rule out corner solutions (aA ≤ aU), we make the simplifying assumption
that the shape parameter k is bounded from above as well: k ≤ (ε− 1)[fE + fD]. Finally, we
are left with ex post aggregate per period industry profits in autarky equal to
ΠA = NE
∫ aA
0
πA (a) dG (a)
= NE [V (aA)BA −G(aA)fD] = αµ
k
. (10)
4Since productivity is distributed Pareto, this is not an issue as it can be shown that
V (aD)BT −G(aD)fD + V (aX)(tτ )
1−εBT
t
−G(aX)fX ≤ fE .
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This solution for ΠA gives us a simple parametric expression that will be used to underpin
the values to LA and to LT of swinging the government’s decision in their respective favors.
3.2 Basics of a Trade Agreement
To develop the framework needed to analyze equilibrium under a trade agreement, begin by
assuming that a trade agreement proposed by the two governments has been adopted. We
can now derive the expressions we need to evaluate the payoffs entailed. Under the trade
agreement, a given firm will continue to produce domestically if it makes nonnegative profits
from doing so. There exists a cutoff productivity level aD which represents the productivity
of the firm that is indifferent under the trade agreement between supplying the domestic
market and exiting:
µ
ε
(
aD
αPT
)1−ε
= fD. (11)
A firm will export if the profits from doing so are positive. The cutoff productivity level aX
for becoming an exporter is given by the following condition:
µ
εt
(
τ taX
αP∗T
)1−ε
= γfD. (12)
Since we are considering a symmetric trade agreement in which trade restrictions are at
the same level in both countries, with aggregate expenditure on good X identical across
both countries and equal to µ, we will have a symmetric equilibrium under an agreement
and henceforth drop the ∗ superscripts. Thus, these two conditions (11) and (12) close the
model under the trade agreement. Since firm productivity is distributed Pareto, we can find
closed form solutions for the two cutoffs:
aD =
[
γψτ kt
k
α
γψτkt
k
α + t
ψfE
fD
] 1
k
aU ;
aX =
[
1
γψτkt
k
α + t
ψfE
γfD
] 1
k
aU .
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Using these cut-offs, we are able to calculate ex-post aggregate industry profits in an equi-
librium under the trade agreement, ΠT :
ΠT = NE
∫ aD
0
πT (a) dG (a)
=
αµ
k
[
γψτkt
k
α + 1
γψτkt
k
α + t
]
(13)
Note that since by (10) ΠA = αµ/k, we can write ΠT as
ΠT = ΠA
[
γψτ kt
k
α + 1
γψτ kt
k
α + t
]
. (14)
For the firm ϕ that is just indifferent between autarky and the trade agreement,
∆π(ϕ) = πT (ϕ)− πA(ϕ) = 0.
Explicitly, ϕ is determined as follows:
ϕ =
(
1
γ
[
(1 + τ 1−εt−ε)− F 1−ε]) 1ε−1 aD = λaD (15)
where
F ≡
[
γψτ kt
k
α
γψτkt
k
α + t
] 1
k
,
and
λ =
(
1
γ
[
(1 + τ 1−εt−ε)− F 1−ε]) 1ε−1 .
We can use the expressions for aggregate profits and aggregate contributions that we have
derived to determine how the outcome of the lobbying process is related to aggregate profits.
For given tariff revenue, the greater is vA compared to vT , the more likely autarky is to
be the outcome. So it will be useful to be able to relate the difference in lobbying revenues
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to the difference in aggregate profits. Using (10), (14), (5), and (6),5
vA − vT = NE
∫ aA
0
(πA (a)− πT (a)) dG (a)
= ΠA − ΠT . (16)
Therefore, the difference in the values to LA and LT is determined by the difference in
aggregate profits under the two outcomes. This insight will be useful in determining the
outcome of a proposed agreement.
3.3 Trade Agreement Over NTBs
In this setting we will consider an agreement over NTBs, τ , while setting t = 1. In this
setting any agreement that the governments reach raises no revenue; TR(1, τ) = 0. So the
home government’s problem (4) may be simplified to
max
τ
{lA(1, τ), lT (1, τ)}.
It can be seen by inspection of (14) that if we set tariffs equal to zero in that expression
(i.e. t = 1) and focus on τ as the only form of trade restriction, ex-post aggregate industry
profits in autarky and the trade agreement are always equal for any proposed agreement,
i.e. ΠT = ΠA = αµ/k for any τ . Therefore, by (16), vA = vT .
6 Intuitively, this means that
the aggregate gains from adopting the trade agreement exactly offset the aggregate losses;
for any given proposed level of τ , the value to LA of maintaining autarky is the same as the
value to LT of adopting the trade agreement. So we can say that in an agreement over NTBs
the lobby groups have ‘homogenous valuations’. Taking the agreement NTB level as given
at τ , we can then analyze the interaction between the lobby groups as a game that takes the
5This derivation uses the fact that piT (a) = 0 for a ∈ [aD, aA] to rewrite equation (14) as ΠT =
NE
∫ aA
0
piT (a) dG (a) .
6It should be noted that this result is driven by the unique properties of both the Pareto distribution and
the iceberg transport cost assumptions. However, the tensions described are present in general.
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form of an all-pay auction. The Nash equilibrium outcome of a two-player all-pay auction
with homogeneous valuations is known from Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock
and de Vries (1996). Their characterization of equilibrium is adapted to the present context
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In an agreement over NTBs, taking the agreed NTB τ as given, the Nash equi-
librium is unique and symmetric. The value to lobby group LA of remaining in autarky is
the same as the value to LT of moving to a proposed trade agreement for any τ between
(and including) autarky and free trade. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is one in which
both LA and LT randomize their respective contributions lA and lT continuously on the in-
terval [0, vA]. Since the lobby groups randomize continuously, the highest contribution wins
with probability one. Each lobby group earns an expected payoff of zero in equilibrium. The
expected payoff to the government is vA = vT .
This equilibrium characterization has a number of interesting features. First, there can be
no equilibrium in pure strategies. To see this note from (7) that if one lobby group adopts
the pure strategy of contributing their value then it is rational for the other lobby group
to contribute nothing. Then the first lobby group would have an incentive to deviate to a
contribution just above zero, giving rise to a further incentive for the lobby group contributing
nothing to adopt a positive contribution level.
This logic also applies to mixed strategies where either lobby group tends to favor a
contribution at a particular contribution level in the interval [0, vA] but does not contribute
at that level with certainty. As a benchmark, consider the situation where a given lobby group
randomizes continuously over the interval [0, vA]; that is, it does not favor any particular
contribution level within the interval. Then with a continuous probability distribution the
probability that any particular contribution level is chosen is zero. On the other hand, if a
particular contribution level li ∈ [0, vA] is favored by Li then we say that Li ‘puts mass’ at li;
that is, it contributes li with positive probability. But if Li puts mass at li ∈ [0, vA] then Lj ,
j 6= i has an incentive to shift mass to a point above li such that it outbids Li on average and
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increases its expected payoff at Li’s expense. Once one group puts mass at vA, the tendency
is for the other group to put mass at zero and so on. Consequently, both lobby groups must
randomize continuously on the entire interval [0, vA] , competing each others’ expected profits
from the contest to zero in the process. The reason the government’s expected revenue is
vA is because each lobby group expects to contribute vA/2 = vT /2 on average. The reason
expected payoffs to the lobby groups are zero is because each group expects to win half the
time.
In one respect this outcome mirrors the outcome one would obtain in Bagwell and
Staiger’s framework, where there are two goods, countries are equally sized, and govern-
ments do not have distributional concerns over trade policy outcomes. Then free trade
would be reached in a trade agreement. The key difference in the outcome we show above,
however, is that this feature holds only in expectation, with the actual policy outcome going
either way with equal probability and each lobby group having the potential to have positive
or negative gains. This means that the outcome of a trade agreement may fail to get off the
ground in any given period even though on efficiency grounds it should do so.
So far we have only said that the governments may propose to reduce NTBs from autarky
in a symmetrical trade agreement. We can go further and predict the trade agreement that
the governments will propose. To do so, first recall that both lobby groups randomize
continuously over [0, vA]. So in order to maximize the lobby groups’ average contributions,
each government needs to choose τ in such a way as to maximize the value of autarky
vA(1, τ), to LA. For this, the government needs to choose τ in such a way that it makes the
firms who would lobby for autarky as badly off as possible under the trade agreement:7
max
τ
vA(1, τ) = max
τ
NE
[∫ aA
ϕ
πA(a)dG(a)−
∫ aX
ϕ
πX(a)dG(a)−
∫ aD
ϕ
πD(a)dG(a)
]
. (17)
To characterize the problem, first note that when the agreement NTB level changes, the
following also change: the indifferent firm between autarky and trade, ϕ; the least efficient
7Identically, the government could maximize vT and arrive at the same revenue maximizing policy.
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exporter, aX ; the profits of an exporting firm, πX(a); the least efficient purely domestic firm,
aD; and the domestic profits of firms that would prefer autarky to trade. By definition, it
follows that πX(aX) = 0, πD(aD) = 0 and πA(ϕ) − πT (ϕ) = 0. Therefore, the tension we
are concerned with is how the decrease in domestic profits that occur when the government
reduces τ weigh against the increase in profits from exporting. In formal terms:
dvA(1, τ)
dτ
= −NE
[∫ aX
ϕ
dπX(a)
dτ
dG(a) +
∫ aD
ϕ
dπD(a)
dτ
dG(a)
]
. (18)
The first term in brackets captures the sum of the export profit πX(a) of the group of firms
that export but would be better off in autarky, a ∈ (ϕ, aX). The second term in brackets
captures the domestic profits of those same firms, plus the domestic profits of the firms that
only serve the domestic market. As NTBs are lowered, πD(a) is reduced for all firms. But at
the same time, as NTBs are lowered, this increases the return that a given firm would make
from exports. Lowering NTBs also changes the set of firms that would find it profitable
to export. The lower the NTB in the trade agreement, the larger the mass of firms that
would prefer the trade agreement to autarky; ϕ increases. These are the tensions that the
government faces in setting τ . The balance of these tensions is revealed in our first lemma.
Lemma 2. The NTB policy that maximizes lobby revenue for the government is free trade;
i.e. τ = 1.
The proof shows that
dvA(1, τ)
dτ
= −NEkfD
τψ
[
γψτ k+1−ε − 1]λk+1−ε(aD
aU
)k
ǫτaD < 0 ∀ τ ≥ 1
where ǫτaD is the elasticity of the marginal purely domestic firm. This is negative because
γ > 1, τ ≥ 1, and k > ε − 1. This means that the value of autarky to the firms in
LA monotonically increases as τ is reduced. So by lowering the tariff associated with the
agreement each government increases the interval [0, vA] over which both firms continuously
randomize their contributions, hence increasing the size of the (average) contribution that
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the government expects to receive from each of the lobby groups. By combining Lemmas 1
and 2 we can say that, under an agreement involving NTBs, the governments will propose
an agreement that involves free trade: τ = 1.
Proposition 1. Assume an agreement over NTBs. The governments propose a free trade
agreement, wherein τ = 1. Both LA and LT randomize their respective contributions lA and
lT continuously on the interval [0, vA] and the highest contribution wins with probability one.
Each lobby group earns an expected payoff of zero in equilibrium. The expected payoff to the
government is vA = vT .
The key feature of equilibrium in Proposition 1, which does not feature in Bagwell and
Staiger (1999), is that the trade agreement may not go ahead even though it would increase
efficiency. If LA makes a higher contribution than LT then the agreement stalls and the
economy remains in autarky.
Figure 1: Profits Under Two Regimes: Autarky and Trade
0
a
aX
Total profit under trade
Profit curve in autarky
aD
aA
pi(a)
ϕ
Further intuition about the characterization of equilibrium can be gleaned from the graph-
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ical illustration in Figure 1. As explained above, the government’s problem can be formalized
as seeking to maximize aggregate contributions by LA. Our formalization shows that this is
equivalent to maximizing the difference between profits under autarky and the trade agree-
ment, or maximizing the shaded region in Figure 1. With a lower tariff domestic profits
decrease, as illustrated by a downward shift of the blue line. However, at the same time
profits from exporting increase thereby shifting the green line to the right. Under NTBs,
this area is maximized under free trade, τ = 1. The government receives this aggregate
contribution from both lobby groups whichever group makes the higher contribution and
whether or not the agreement goes ahead.
3.4 Trade Agreement Over Tariffs
Next we consider an agreement over tariffs, t, while setting τ = 1. Tariff revenue is raised
by any outcome other than autarky and free trade, and so equation (4) is the appropriate
expression of the Home government’s problem. For this form of agreement we need to
calculate explicitly how much tariff revenue the government would receive for any tariff level
t in a proposed agreement:
TR = (t− 1)× imports value
= (t− 1)NE
∫ aX
0
p(a)x(a)dG(a)
=
[
(t− 1)
γψt
k
α + t
]
µ. (19)
To calculate aggregate profits of the firms that prefer the trade agreement we set τ = 1
in (13) to obtain
ΠT =
αµ
k
[
γψt
k
α + 1
γψt
k
α + t
]
. (20)
We can now calculate, for any trade agreement involving positive but non-prohibitive tariffs
t > 1, the difference between the aggregate profits of firms that prefer autarky and those
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that prefer the trade agreement. This is calculated by taking the difference between (14)
(with τ = 1) and (20). Interestingly, the aggregate profits of firms that gain from the trade
agreement are less than the aggregate profits of those who would prefer autarky:
0 ≤ ΠA −ΠT =
[
(t− 1)
γψt
k
α + t
]
αµ
k
= θTR ≤ TR,
where θ = α/k < 1. However, from this expression we can also say that the combined
aggregate profits of firms that prefer the trade agreement plus tariff revenue is greater than
the aggregate profits of firms that prefer autarky:
ΠT ≤ ΠA ≤ ΠT + TR. (21)
Using equation (16), we have that
vA − TR ≤ vT ,
holding with equality only at autarky and free trade. So although the value of the agreement
net of tariff revenue to LT is less than the value of remaining in autarky is to LA, the aggregate
value of a trade agreement to LT and the government is greater than the value of autarky
to LA. Since LT only has to bring the aggregate value of contributions (inclusive of tariff
revenue) above the level made by LA, the presence of tariff revenue will tend to shift the
outcome in LT ’s favor. The presence of this asymmetry in the agreement over tariffs changes
the basic characterization from an all-pay auction with homogenous valuations to one where
valuations are heterogeneous. Once again, we can use Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye,
Kovenock and de Vries (1996) to characterize the equilibrium outcome of the trade agreement
over tariffs.
We know from the prior literature that the outcome of an equilibrium with heterogeneous
valuations differs from that with homogeneous valuations in that under heterogeneous valu-
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ations there may be an incentive to put mass at a certain value. We allow for this possibility
in our present setting by introducing the following notation: αi (z) denotes the mass that
lobby i ∈ {A, T} puts at the contribution level li = z;8 li ∼ U [x, y] denotes that lobby i
randomizes its contribution continuously over the uniform distribution U [x, y].
We can now use similar logic as for a trade agreement with NTBs to determine the ranges
over which the respective lobbies will contribute. First let us consider contributions by LA.
As with NTBs, there can be no incentive to bid more than vA. But, differently from the
NTB case, if TR > 0 then any lA < TR will lose for sure. In addition, as in the NTB case,
there can be no incentive to contribute a positive amount with positive probability because
LT can win for sure with a slightly higher aggregate (i.e. inclusive of TR) contribution. We
can therefore say, without loss of generality, that LA may put mass at 0, i.e. may choose to
set αA (0) > 0. In any case LA will, with probability 1− αA (0), randomize its contribution
continuously over the interval lA ∼ U [TR, vA].
Next let us consider contributions by LT . As with NTBs, there can be no incentive
to bid less than 0. But, differently from the NTB case, any contribution above vA − TR
would be wasteful given that the government receives TR > 0 as well if the agreement goes
ahead. Therefore, without loss of generality, LT may put mass at 0, setting αT (0) > 0,
and with probability 1 − α (0) randomize its contribution continuously over the interval
lT ∼ U [0, vA − TR]. The characterization of equilibrium then entails determination of
equilibrium values for αA (0) and αT (0).
As the next step towards characterization, observe that the choices of equilibrium strate-
gies by LA and LT , together with the corresponding expected payoffs, are completely char-
acterized in Table 1.
Using the fact that LA will contribute lA = 0 with probability αA (0) and lA ∼ U [TR, vA]
with probability 1 − αA (0), while LT will contribute lT = 0 with probability αT (0) and
lT ∼ U [0, vA− TR] with probability 1−αT (0), the payoffs in Table 1 can be translated into
8That is, αi (z) denotes the probability with which Li contributes the level li = z.
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Table 1: Expected payoffs
Autarky Lobby
lA = 0 lA ∼ U [TR, vA]
lT = 0
A = 0
T = vT
G = TR
A = vA −
(
vA+TR
2
)
T = 0
G =
(
vA+TR
2
)
Trade
Lobby
lT ∼ U [0, (vA − TR)]
A = 0
T = vT −
(
vA−TR
2
)
G = TR +
(
vA−TR
2
)
A = vA
2
− ( vA+TR
2
)
T = vT
2
− ( vA−TR
2
)
G = TR
2
+ vA
expected payoff functions for the respective lobbies and for the government. Writing the
expected payoff for lobby LA as E[uA], we can write LA’s expected payoff function as:
E[uA] = 0αA(0) +
[(
vA − TR
2
)
αT (0)−
(
TR
2
)
(1− αT (0))
]
(1− αA(0))
=
[
vA
2
αT (0)− TR
2
]
(1− αA(0)). (22)
For LT ’s expected payoff, we have:
E[uT ] = [vTαA(0) + 0(1− αA(0))]αT (0)+[(
vT −
(
vA − TR
2
))
αA(0) +
(
vT
2
−
(
vA − TR
2
))
(1− αA(0))
]
(1− αT (0))
= vTαA(0)αT (0) +
[
vT
2
αA(0) +
vT
2
−
(
vA − TR
2
)]
(1− αT (0)) (23)
Finally, for the government’s expected payoff we have:
E[uG] = αT (0)
[
αA(0)
(
TR− vA
2
)
+
(
vA + TR
2
)]
+ (1− αT (0))
[[
2vA + TR
2
]
− αA(0)vA
2
]
= αT (0)
(
αA(0)TR− vA
2
)
+
[
2vA + TR
2
]
− αA(0)vA
2
(24)
We now use these payoff functions in the characterization of equilibrium.
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3.4.1 Characterizing Equilibrium of an Agreement over Tariffs
Following the same approach as for NTBs, we begin by taking the agreement tariff level as
given at t and analyze the interaction between the lobby groups as a game that takes the
form of an all-pay auction. First consider the situation where t = 1 so that the outcome
corresponds to free trade, wherein TR = 0. In that case, vA = vT and the game is one of
homogeneous valuations as in the NTB case. This is analyzed exactly as in the NTB case, so
that in equilibrium the expected payoff to LA and LT are both equal to zero and the payoff
to the government equal to vA = vT , which is the same as characterized in Lemma 1.
Next consider the situation where t > 1 and, by assumption for now, both lobbies make
positive contributions. We will characterize below the circumstances under which the lobbies
make a contribution. As before, the equilibrium involves both lobbies playing a mixed strat-
egy. As a result of the advantage given to LT by the fact that vT > vA−TA, LT can always
outbid LA. As a result, LA can do no better in equilibrium than if it did not contribute,
i.e. E[uA] = 0. But if LA did not contribute at all then LT could win with a very small
contribution, inviting LA to make a slightly larger contribution itself. So both lobby groups
contribute at positive levels in expectation in equilibrium and, following the same logic as
for the NTB game, contribution at a positive level must involve continuous randomization
of contribution levels for both lobby groups. Moreover, LA cannot make a lower return than
0 in equilibrium because it could obtain a higher payoff from playing a pure strategy lA = 0.
And it cannot make a higher return than 0 because this would mean that LT would make
a return lower than vT − (vA − TR), inducing LT to secure a return of vT − (vA − TR)− ǫ
by playing a pure strategy lT = vA− TR+ ǫ. So in equilibrium LA chooses αA (0) such that
E[uA] = 0.
Staying with the case where t > 1 and both lobbies make positive contributions, and
turning to lobby LT , it can always win for sure by playing a pure strategy vT = vA−TR+ ǫ,
obtaining a payoff of vT − (vA−TR)− ǫ for sure. But it can obtain a higher expected payoff
vT −(vA−TR) by randomizing continuously over the interval [0, vA−TR] and making a zero
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contribution with probability (vT − (vA − TR)) / (vT ). LT cannot obtain a higher expected
payoff than vT − (vA−TR), because this would mean that LA would make a lower expected
return than 0, inducing LA simply to refrain from making a contribution. So in equilibrium
LT chooses αT (0) such that E[uT ] = vT − (vA − TR).
The foregoing observations about equilibrium enable us to solve for αA(0) and αT (0).
First, we can use the fact that in equilibrium E[uA] = 0 in (22) to obtain αT (0) =
TR
vA
. In
the same way, using the fact that in equilibrium E[uT ] = vT − (vA − TR), plus the fact that
αT (0) =
TR
vA
, to obtain αA(0) = 1− (vA−TR)vT .
We can now characterize the circumstances under which the lobbies will make a contri-
bution in equilibrium. We can see from the solutions just obtained that at TR = vA we have
that αA(0) = αT (0) = 1, implying that neither LA nor LT will make a positive contribution
in equilibrium at this level of TR or above. The reason is that the high level of TR gives vT
such an advantage that it does not have to contribute towards the agreement to persuade
the government to choose it, and there is nothing LA can do to stop the agreement from
going ahead. As we will see, TR ≥ vA can arise for some tariff levels. Therefore, we must
allow for the possibility that neither LA nor LT make positive contributions given TR ≥ vA.
In order to fully characterize the equilibrium outcome, we need to establish the relation-
ship between TR and vA. To begin with, we can show that
vA = (1 + χ)θTR, (25)
vT = χθTR (26)
where
χ =
λkγ
k
ε−1 t
k
α
(t− 1) .
So
vA
vT
= 1 +
1
χ
,
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and 1
χ
is a measure of the wedge between vA and vT . This wedge primarily depends on the
marginal exporting firm indifferent between the trade agreement and autarky (ϕ = λaD),
the difference between the fixed cost of entry to a foreign and domestic market (fX = γfD),
and the proposed tariff rate (t). Holding all else equal, as λ increases, the proportion of
active firms in the trade equilibrium (aD) that prefer trade (a < ϕ) increases. This lowers
the gap between vA and vT . Similarly, as γ increases, we see from (15) that ϕ decreases, but
this is countered by the direct effect of γ
k
ε−1 which increases χ.9 In other words, though it is
more costly to become an exporter, once a firm becomes one there are greater ex post profits,
thereby increasing vT and lowering the gap between vA and vT . Finally, as we approach the
free trade equilibrium (t → 1), then 1
χ
→ 0 and we are left with our result that vA = vT .
Moreover, as we approach autarky (t → ∞), then tariff revenue goes to zero again leaving
us with our result that vA = vT .
Next, it will be useful to establish the bounds on the term F ≡
[
γψt
k
α
γψt
k
α+t
] 1
k
.
Lemma 3. F is bounded between
(
1
2
) 1
k and 1.
The proof simply shows that F has well defined endpoints at
(
1
2
) 1
k and ∞ and that it varies
monotonically between these endpoints.
Before proceeding to the next lemma, it will be helpful to have some additional notation.
Denote by t¯ the tariff level at which vA = TR and by tˆ the tariff level at which TR is
maximized. Armed with the foregoing results and notation, we can now state the next
lemma.
Lemma 4. tˆ > t¯.
Lemma 4 shows that tariff revenue is still increasing at vA = TR, where both lobbies cease
to make contributions. Based on this specification of the game, we can now provide a basic
9Note that
dχ
dγ
=
ψt(Fλ)k+1−ε
(t− 1)γ > 0.
29
characterization of equilibrium of the lobbying game, taking as given a non-prohibitive tariff
level t.
Lemma 5. In an agreement over tariffs, there are three possibilities:
(i) if t = 1 then the equilibrium is symmetric and exactly as characterized in Lemma 1.
(ii) If 1 < t ≤ t¯ then TR > 0 and the Nash equilibrium is unique and asymmetric. Then
in equilibrium, LT contributes lT = 0 with probability αT (0) = TR/vA, and randomizes its
contribution continuously over lT ∼ U (0, vA − TR] with probability 1−αT (0). In equilibrium,
LA contributes lA = 0 with probability αA (0) = (vT − (vA − TR)) / (vT ), and randomizes its
contribution continuously on lT ∼ U [TR, vA] with probability 1 − αT (0). LT ’s expected
payoff in equilibrium is E[uT ] = vT − (vA−TR), while LA’s expected payoff in equilibrium is
E[uA] = 0, and the government’s expected payoff is E[uG] = αA(0)
(
TR2−v2
A
2vA
)
+ vA.
(iii) If t > t¯, both lobby groups contribute zero and the only payoff to the government is
through tariff revenue. The expected payoff to the government inclusive of lobby revenue and
tariff revenue is E[uG] = TR.
Lemma 5 shows that the determination of government expected revenues through strategic
interaction between the lobbies will be different depending on whether t = 1, 1 < t ≤ t¯, or
t > t¯. The government’s objective is therefore to choose whichever tariff level from among
these three brings about the highest expected revenues.
Differentiating the government’s expected payoff yields the following:
dE[uG]
dt
=


(
TR2−v2A
2vA
)
dαA(0)
dt
+ αA(0)TR
vA
dTR
dt
+
(
1− αA(0)(TR2+v2A)
2v2
A
)
dvA
dt
if t ∈ [1, t¯]
dTR
dt
if t¯ < t
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where
dαA(0)
dt
=
1
vT
[
dTR
dt
− dvA
dt
−
(
TR− vA
vT
)
dvT
dt
]
=
1
vT
[
(1− θ)dTR
dt
− αA(0)dvT
dt
]
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Thus the government must weigh how the tariff affects both its potential tariff revenue and
the contributions of both lobbies. Although this is a complicated problem, the solution will
actually involve one of two possible outcomes: the government chooses either free trade or a
tariff that maximizes tariff revenue. To show this, we break the problem down into parts.
First we introduce an assumption to ensure that the government’s first order condition (27)
is negative at free trade: k ≥ ε− α10
Lemma 6. If k ≥ ε− α then the government’s expected payoff is decreasing at free trade.
By Lemma 4, we know that E[uG] is increasing at t¯ and there is a local maximum at
tˆ = argmaxTR.11 Therefore the government will choose between free trade and tˆ. We
characterize this choice and the equilibrium under tariffs in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume an agreement over tariffs. The governments propose a free trade
agreement if
vA(1, 1) > maxTR
⇔
[
2−
[
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k
] k
ε−1
>

 k(1 + γψ)(
(k − α)γψ tˆ kα
)


and propose tariffs to maximize TR otherwise. In the case where free trade is proposed, both
LA and LT randomize their respective contributions lA and lT continuously on the interval
[0, vA] and the highest contribution wins with probability one. Each lobby group earns an
expected payoff of zero in equilibrium. The expected payoff to the government is vA = vT . In
10This additional assumption is for brevity and is in line with the empirical literature (See for example
Del Gatto et al. 2008 and Crozet and Koenig 2010). Allowing for the entire parameter space (i.e. k > ε− 1)
would result in ambiguity:
dE[UG]
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→1, k=ε−1
=
[
2− 4α− α2
2(1− α)
]
µ
2k
≤ 0⇔ α ≥
√
6− 2 ≈ 0.45.
11In the appendix, we confirm that there is unique extremum for the parameter space t ∈ [1, t¯] that is a
minimum.
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the case where tˆ is proposed, both LA and LT contribute zero and the payoff to the government
is TR(tˆ) with certainty.
This result shows that, out of the three possible types of outcome characiterized in Lemma
5, only one of two will arise. Either the government will choose free trade or it will choose
the revenue maximizing tariff. The forces brought to light in the agreement over NTBs
may dominate in equilibrium, in that proposing free trade induces the lobbies to maximize
their contributions and these are greater than the maximum possible tariff revenue. Or the
conventional forces of tariff revenue maximization dominate, in which case contributions by
the lobbies could not sway the government decision. We will now undertake comaprative
statics to explore the parameter values under which each respective possible equilibrium
outcome is more likely to prevail.
3.4.2 Comparative Statics
We first present a comparative statics result for the parameter γ:
Lemma 7. The government is more likely to choose free trade the greater the fixed cost to
exporting is relative to the fixed cost of serving the domestic market, i.e. the greater is γ.
Intuitively, as the fixed cost of exporting, γ, increases there are less exporters which means
there is a smaller tax base on which to generate tariff revenue. However, matters are less
straight forward in consideration of contributions made by LA. On the one hand there is less
foreign competition as γ is increased, which implies each firm that favors autarky is willing
to contribute less to see that it is maintained. But on the other hand, there are more firms
that prefer autarky (i.e. dϕ/dγ < 0 and daD/dγ > 0) which means more firms contribute
in support of autarky. The proof shows that the negative effect of an increase in γ on tariff
revenue will always outweigh the potentially negative effect on lobby contributions, making
free trade more likely to arise in equilibrium.
The model properties derived in Lemma 7 are illustrated in Figure 2. For values of
k = 2.5 and α = 0.4, Figure 2 shows that for γ = 1.05 or γ = 1.1, the expected government
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payoff is maximized at the revenue maximizing tariff. On the other hand, when γ increases
to 1.15 or 1.2, the expected government payoff is maximized at free trade.
Figure 2: Expected Government payoff when k = 2.5 and α = 0.4
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These properties are somewhat surprising. They suggest that when the fixed costs of
exporting are relatively high then a trade agreement, if it is struck, is likely to go all the way
to free trade, whereas when fixed costs of exporting are relatively low a trade agreement may
involve positive tariffs. One might have expected the opposite; that any trade agreement is
likely to involve greater liberalization the lower are the fixed costs of exporting. Another
interesting feature of this equilibrium is that in the parameter range where a trade agreement
involves free trade, the agreement is not guaranteed since LA may make the higher contri-
bution in equilibrium. However, in the parameter range where a trade agreement involves
positive tariffs, the trade agreement will go ahead for sure.
We next turn our attention to comparative statics of the shape parameter k. It can easily
be shown that tariff revenue is decreasing in k:
k
TR
dTR
dk
= −

k [ε log(t) + log(γ)] γψt kα
(ε− 1)
(
γψt
k
α + t
)

 < 0.
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As k increases, the distribution becomes more skewed towards less productive firms which
decreases the ex ante expected profit and thus lowers the number of firms taking a draw. This
in turn reduces the number of large exporting firms, lowering the amount of tariff revenue
generated from imports. In terms of lobby contributions (vA(1, 1)), when k is sufficiently
large relative to (ε − 1), we have that dvA(1, 1)/dk < 0. The intuition here is that as k
increases there are relatively more firms at the lower end of the productivity distribution,
which lowers aggregate profit (making the black line in Figure 1 flatter). Since the “gains”
from autarky are lower, the amount firms are willing to contribute to stay in autarky are
correspondingly lower as well. In Figure 3 we provide an example in which, for a sufficiently
high value of k, the decrease in tariff revenue dominates the change in lobby contributions
and each government will choose free trade as the proposed policy.
Figure 3: Expected Government payoff when γ = 1.1 and α = 0.4
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Finally we investigate the effect α (and consequently the elasticity of substitution ε) has
on the equilibrium. The effect on tariff revenue is straightforward and positive:
α
TR
dTR
dα
=

k [log(t) + log(γ)] γψt kα
α
(
γψt
k
α + t
)2

 > 0.
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As α increases, so does the elasticity of substitution. This drives down the equilibrium price
for each variety but increases the amount sold. Therefore, even though the amount of tax
collected per unit is lower (since the price decreases) the number of units increases resulting
in higher tariff revenue. Similarly, as long as k is sufficiently large relative to (ε − 1), the
lobby contributions (vA(1, 1)) also increases with α. The intuition for this can be gleaned
from the fact that aggregate profits in autarky increase (see Figure 1 and note that the black
line becomes steeper and shifts up). This means that the profit loss from going to free trade
is now higher despite being spread over fewer firms. In Figure 4 we provide an example
in which tariff revenue increases more than vA(1, 1) in response to an increase in α. For a
sufficiently high α, the government will choose a tariff policy that maximizes tariff revenue
(tˆ) in equilibrium and lobby contributions will be equal to zero.
Figure 4: Expected Government payoff when γ = 1.1 and k = 2.5
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We end our discussion with a summary of how the model parameters affect the tariff that
maximizes tariff revenue, should tˆ be the chosen policy.
Proposition 3. The tariff that maximizes tariff revenue is:
1. Decreasing in γ;
2. Decreasing in the shape parameter k;
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3. Increasing in α and the elasticity of substitution ε.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model of trade agreements where the tension is between
larger firms who have an interest in trade liberalization and smaller firms who would prefer
autarky. This contrasts with the standard framework wherein the conflict of interest over
a trade agreement is between an export sector and an import competing sector. We also
considered lobbying over trade agreement formation in a new way by modelling it as an
all-pay auction instead of the standard framework’s menu-auction approach.
Our model of a trade agreement over NTBs formed a benchmark. In that setting, if
an agreement came about then it involved free trade whereby all the surplus generated by
the agreement was transferred to the government. This result is surprisingly similar to
Example 2 of Grossman and Helpman (1994), which might be taken as a benchmark in that
the strengths of the exporter and import-competing lobbies are equally opposed, derived in
the standard framework. The key difference is that in our all-pay auction framework the
agreement may stall if the autarky lobby makes the bigger contribution, helping to explain
why trade liberalization through trade agreement formation has not been even more rapid.
Our examination of agreements over tariffs brought tariff revenues into play. This tilted
the outcome of the lobbying process in favor of the pro-trade lobby. In spite of the additional
complexities introduced, the equilibrium outcome was surprisingly straight forward. Either
the forces characterized by the agreement over the NTBs would dominate and the trade
agreement, if it came about, would involve free trade. Or the agreement would be determined
entirely by the net tariff revenues raised and there would be no revenues from lobbying in
equilibrium. The surprise here was that relatively high costs of exporting were more likely to
give rise to an agreement that resulted in free trade, if it went ahead, whereas relatively low
costs of exporting would be more likely to give rise to a more conventional looking agreement
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involving positive tariffs and tariff revenue.
What are the future directions for research? It would be useful in future to consider the
role of consumers in our framework. In a qualitative sense, as we argued in the introduction,
the role of consumers is likely to be fairly clear cut. Adding a term in the government’s
payoff function to capture consumer preferences would tilt the outcome in favor of free trade,
while the formal approach to analyzing equilibrium would be the same as in the model of
an agreement over tariffs. Incorporating consumers into the framework would be useful in
terms of trying to get a sense of how much the competing forces matter either as part of
an econometric or calibration exercise. It might then be possible to predict based on the
underlying characteristics of countries when they would be more likely to reach free trade
in a trade agreement, and test these predictions against the data. It might also be possible
to gain a sense of which matters more in trade agreement formation: the conflict of interest
over trade policy between sectors or within sectors.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Propositions
Lemma 2. The NTB policy that maximizes lobby revenue for the government is free trade;
i.e. τ = 1.
Proof. First note that
dπX(a)
dτ
=
(ε− 1)γfD
τ
(
a
aX
)1−ε
ǫτaX =
(1− ε)γfD
τ
(
a
aX
)1−ε(
γψτ k
γψτk + 1
)
dπD(a)
dτ
=
(ε− 1)fD
τ
(
a
aD
)1−ε
ǫτaD =
(ε− 1)fD
τ
(
a
aD
)1−ε(
1
γψτk + 1
)
,
where ǫ refers to elasticity. So the first derivative, equation (18), reduces to:
dvA(1, τ)
dτ
=
−NE(ε− 1)fD
τ
[∫ aX
ϕ
(
a
aX
)1−ε
γǫτaXdG(a) +
∫ aD
ϕ
(
a
aD
)1−ε
ǫτaDdG(a)
]
= −NE(ε− 1)fD
τ
[
γǫτaX
a1−εX
[V (aX)− V (ϕ)] +
ǫτaD
a1−εD
[V (aD)− V (ϕ)]
]
= −NEkfD
τψ
[
γψτk+1−ε − 1]λk+1−ε(aD
aU
)k
ǫτaD < 0 ∀ τ ≥ 1.
This is negative because γ > 1, τ ≥ 1, and k > ε− 1. Therefore, the government will choose
free trade.
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Lemma 3. F is bound between
(
1
2
) 1
k and 1.
Proof. Observe the following limits
lim
γ→1
F =
[
t
k
α
t
k
α + t
] 1
k
, lim
γ→∞
F = 1,
lim
t→1
F =
[
γψ
γψ + 1
] 1
k
, lim
t→∞
F = 1.
Since γ > 1, t > 1, and ψ > 0 the lower bound is
(
1
2
) 1
k .
Lemma 4. tˆ > t¯.
Proof. Recall that vA = (1 + χ)θTR. Define t¯ such that vA = TR, then it must be the case
that
χ(t¯) =
(k − α)
α
.
Consider t˜ = k
k−α
, then
dTR(t˜)
dt
=
µ(
γψ t˜
k
α + t˜
)2 > 0.
Therefore t˜ < tˆ where tˆ = argmaxTR. Next, we need to show that t¯ < t˜; i.e. vA(t˜) < vA(t¯).
To do this, first note that vA evaluated at t˜ is decreasing;
dvA(t˜)
dt
=
µt˜ε−1(
γψ t˜
k
α + t˜
)2 (1− γψ t˜εψ) < 0.
Thus it is sufficient to show that χ(t˜) < χ(t¯)
χ(t˜) =
(
k − α
α
)
λkγψ+1t˜
k
α <
(
(k − α)
α
)
= χ(t¯)[
(1 + t˜−ε)− F 1−ε] t˜ε < 1
1 < F 1−ε.
Since
(
1
2
) 1
k < F < 1 by Lemma 3 and ε > 1, it follows that 1 < F 1−ε < 2
(ε−1)
k . Therefore,
t¯ < t˜ < tˆ.
Lemma 6. The government’s expected payoff is decreasing at free trade if k ≥ ε− α.
Proof. Evaluating the first derivative at free trade yields
dE[UG]
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→1
=
dvA
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→1
− (1− θ)
2
dTR
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→1
(28)
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which equals
dE[UG]
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→1
=
[
γψλk−(ε−1)
(
1− 2(α+ kγ
ψ)
(γψ + 1)
)
− (k − 3α)
2
]
µ
k(γψ + 1)
.
It can easily be shown that this is decreasing in k. Therefore, we evaluate this at k = ε− α
and get
dE[UG]
dt
∣∣∣∣
t→1, k=ε−α
=
[
γψλ
1
ε
(
1− γψ − 2α(1 + εαγψ)
(γψ + 1)
)
− (1− 2α)
2
2
]
µ
k(γψ + 1)
< 0.
Proposition 2. Assume an agreement over tariffs. The governments propose a free trade
agreement if
vA(1, 1) > maxTR
⇔
[
2−
[
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k
] k
ε−1
>

 k(1 + γψ)(
(k − α)γψ tˆ kα
)


and propose tariffs to maximize TR otherwise. In the case where free trade is proposed, both
LA and LT randomize their respective contributions lA and lT continuously on the interval
[0, vA] and the highest contribution wins with probability one. Each lobby group earns an
expected payoff of zero in equilibrium. The expected payoff to the government is vA = vT . In
the case where tˆ is proposed, both LA and LT contribute zero and the payoff to the government
is TR(tˆ) with certainty.
Proof. We know from Lemma 4 that tˆ > t¯; tariff revenue is maximized at tˆ over the range
t ∈ [t¯, tˆ]). So the government will always choose tˆ in preference to any tariff t ∈ [t¯, tˆ). We
also know from Lemma 6 that the government’s expected payoff is decreasing in t at free
trade. For the government to choose only between free trade and tˆ, it is sufficient to show
that the government’s expected payoff is convex on the interval [1, t¯] and that any extremum
is a minimum.
To begin, write the government’s objective function in terms of χ and tariff revenue, TR:
E[uG] =
[
θ2(1 + χ)2 [θ(2χ+ 1)− 1] + (1− θ)
2θ2χ(1 + χ)
]
TR
= ΥTR
We will now show that this function is convex over the range t ∈ (1, t¯) by showing that Υ is
monotonically decreasing on t ∈ (1, t¯) while TR is monotonically increasing over the same
range. We can easily establish from (19) that TR is monotonically increasing over the range
t ∈ (1, t¯). To show that Υ is monotonically decreasing on t ∈ (1, t¯), first observe that χ is
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monotonically decreasing in t for t ∈ (1, t¯). This can be seen from the first derivative:
dχ
dt
= χ
(
k
λ
dλ
dt
+
k
αt
− 1
(t− 1)
)
= χ


k
(
(k−α)
k
(
1
γ
(
γψt
k
α+t
)
) k+1−ε
k
− 1
t
)
t−ε
αγλε−1
+
k
αt
− 1
(t− 1)


= χ


(k − α)
[(
1
γ
(
γψt
k
α+t
)
)k+1−ε
k
− k
t(k−α)
]
αtεγλε−1
+
[
(k − α)t− k
αt(t− 1)
]

 < 0
The inequality follows from the fact that k > ε − 1 and t < t¯ < t˜ = k
k−α
. Note that the
restriction on the parameter space is a sufficient but not necessary condition.
We can now show that, over the relevant range t ∈ (1, t¯), i.e. χ ∈ (1−θ
θ
,∞), the term Υ
is monotonically decreasing in t. Taking the derivative yields:
dΥ
dt
=
[(
θ3(1 + χ)2 (2χ2 − 1) + θ2(1 + χ)2 + 2θχ+ θ − 2χ− 1)
2θ2χ2(1 + χ)2
]
dχ
dt
= Υχ
dχ
dt
Note that
dΥχ
dχ
= −(1 − θ)
θ2
[
θ2 − 1
χ3
+
1
(χ+ 1)3
]
Since the bracketed term is monotonic in χ, we just need to check the bounds of χ to
determine the sign.
lim
χ→ 1−θ
θ
dΥχ
dχ
=
[
(3− θ)θ2
(1− θ)
]
> 0
lim
χ→∞
dΥχ
dχ
= 0
Thus dΥχ
dχ
> 0 and we now just need to check the limit of Υχ as χ approaches its lower bound,
i.e. χ→ 1−θ
θ
:
lim
χ→ 1−θ
θ
Υχ = 0.
Therefore Υχ > 0 and
dΥ
dt
< 0 for all relevant values of t and χ.
So the government’s payoff function between free trade and t = t¯ is convex and so any
turning point over the range t ∈ (1, t¯) must be a minimum. Therefore, there can exist
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no point on the government’s payoff function greater than either free trade or tˆ and the
government will maximize its payoff by choosing whichever yields the higher payoff.
Lemma 7. The government is more likely to choose free trade the greater the fixed cost to
exporting is relative to the fixed cost of serving the domestic market, i.e. the greater is γ.
Proof. Let
Γ ≡
(
1
tˆε
[
k
(k − α)
] ε−1
k
+ 1
)[
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k
so
dΓ
dγ
= −
[
ψαε
γψ+1k
](
1
tˆε
[
k
(k − α)
] ε−1
k
+ 1
)[
1 + γψ
γψ
]−(k−(ε−1))
k
− ε
tˆ2ε
[
k
(k − α)
] ε−1
k
[
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k dtˆ
dγ
= −
[
ψαε
γk
] [
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k
(
1 +
1
tˆε
[
k
(k − α)
] ε−1
k
[
1− αtˆ
1−ε
(k − α)(tˆ− 1)γψ tˆk−αα
])
We know from Lemma 4 that
tˆ >
k
k − α
so
dΓ
dγ
∣∣∣∣
tˆ=t˜
= −
[
ψαε
γk
] [
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k
(
1 +
1
t˜ε
[
k
(k − α)
] ε−1
k
[
1− αtˆ
1−ε
αγψ tˆ
k−α
α
])
= −
[
ψαε
γk
] [
1 + γψ
γψ
] ε−1
k
(
1 +
t˜
ε−1
k
t˜ε
[
1− tˆ
1−ε
γψ tˆ
k−α
α
])
< 0.
The previous inequality follows from the fact that d
2Γ
dγdtˆ
< 0.
Proposition 3. The tariff that maximizes tariff revenue is:
1. Decreasing in γ;
2. Decreasing in the shape parameter k;
3. Increasing in α and the elasticity of substitution ε.
Proof. The tariff that maximizes tariff revenue is defined by tˆ such that
(k − α)γψ tˆ kα =
(
kγψ tˆ
k
α
−1 + α
)
(29)
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Totally differentiating (29) yields:
γ
tˆ
dtˆ
dγ
= −
[
ψα2
k(k − α)(tˆ− 1)γψ tˆk−αα
]
< 0 (30)
k
tˆ
dtˆ
dk
= −
[
log
(
γtˆε
)
(k(tˆ− 1)− αtˆ)
ε(k − α)(tˆ− 1) +
α
(k − α)
]
< 0 (31)
α
tˆ
dtˆ
dα
=

 α2tˆ
(
γk+1 + γ
k
α tˆ
k
α
)
kγ
k
α tˆ
k
α (k − α) (tˆ− 1) +
log
(
tˆγ
)
(k(tˆ− 1)− αtˆ)
(k − α) (tˆ− 1)

 > 0. (32)
These inequalities follow from the fact that tˆ > k
k−α
(as shown in Lemma 4) and γ > 1.
Recall also that dε
dα
= αε2 > 0.
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